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Charles G. Finney
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6 published passages in 3 sermons · 55 withdrawn, of 61 flagged in 39 sermons read
Sermons: 22 read whole · 39 read in their reframes
Each quote is the sermon’s words, said in the preacher’s own voice.
| Sermon | What was said | Matches | Result |
|---|---|---|---|
| On Loving Godpreached c. 1860 · #8234 |
| Pelagianism, rejected at the Council of Carthage, 418: Because God commands, the human being must be able to obey“Because God commands, the human being must be able to obey — 'if I ought, I can'.” Words as recorded in Pelagius, Epistula ad Demetriadem (Letter to Demetrias), Ad Demetriadem 2-8, 16, 413 · Condemned by a council · Council of Carthage, 418 · source: the file records no link for this document | Published the claim held on all 3 challenges read in the whole sermon the challenges, in fullChallenge 1: the claim heldThe sentence is Finney's own expository premise, not the read text (the text read is Matt 22:37) and not anyone else's voice; he states it as a principle of divine justice and then draws the conclusion from it — "This fundamental precept of the law cannot therefore be a thing of such sort that we have no voluntary power to do it" — which is exactly the inference from command to ability that the proposition names. The claim is unqualified: "beyond our power to do" is glossed as "not within the control of our voluntary powers," with no distinction between natural and moral ability and no reference to enabling grace, so the Edwardsean/Tridentine orthodox forms of "God does not command the impossible" (where the ability is given by grace, or where moral inability still condemns) are not what is being taught here. What survives is the bare maxim that whatever God demands on pain of damnation must lie within our own voluntary power. Scripture: not a Bible quotation Challenge 2: the claim heldThe sentence is Finney's own doctrinal argument, not scripture read aloud, not a quotation, and not a view stated to be answered — it is the premise of his exposition ("I observe then first..."), and he immediately draws the Pelagian inference in his own voice: because the precept is commanded, it "cannot therefore be a thing of such sort that we have no voluntary power to do it." That is precisely "if I ought, I can," reasoning from obligation to ability. The available orthodox qualifications do not fit: Augustine and Trent hold that the commandments are possible only by grace, whereas Finney grounds the possibility in "the control of our voluntary powers" with no reference to grace, and the nearby principle that guilt presupposes voluntariness will not carry the sentence, since he argues from the command's existence to our natural power to keep it. Scripture: not a Bible quotation Challenge 3: the claim heldThis is Finney's own expository argument, not scripture read aloud and not a view voiced in order to be answered — he is establishing the first premise of his exposition of Matthew 22:37, and he presses it immediately after: "This fundamental precept of the law cannot therefore be a thing of such sort that we have no voluntary power to do it. In all reasonable law, every precept requires only voluntary action." The sentence states the "if I ought, I can" inference in its exact form, reasoning from the fact of the command to the presence of the power. The one orthodox-sounding neighbour — Augustine's and Trent's "God commands nothing impossible" — locates the enabling in grace; Finney locates it in "the control of our voluntary powers" and nowhere appeals to grace, which is the precise move Carthage 418 condemned. Scripture: not a Bible quotation |
| The Wrath of God Against Those Who Withstand His Truthpreached c. 1857 · #8230 |
| Semi-Pelagianism, rejected at the Second Council of Orange, 529: the claim that we can make any right choice relating to salvation, or assent to the preaching of the gospel…“Canon 5 anathematises the claim that the beginning of faith and the very desire to believe belong to us by nature and not by a gift of grace; canon 6 the claim that God has mercy when, apart from his grace, we believe, will, desire, strive, labour, pray, watch, study, seek, ask or knock; canon 7 the claim that we can make any right choice relating to salvation, or assent to the preaching of the gospel, by natural powers without the illumination of the Holy Spirit; canon 4 the claim that God awaits our will to be cleansed rather than causing that will.” Words as recorded in Second Council of Orange (Concilium Arausicanum II), canon 7, 529-07-03 · Condemned by a council · Second Council of Orange (Concilium Arausicanum II), 529 · source: The Canons of the Second Council of Orange, with the concluding definition | Published the claim held on all 3 challenges read in the whole sermon the same words were also matched against Semi-Pelagianism and Socinianism, where they were withdrawn the challenges, in fullChallenge 1: the claim heldFinney asserts this in his own expository voice, not reading scripture (the scripture check found no match) and not voicing another; it is the premise his whole indictment rests on. The sentence does not merely say sinners suppress natural revelation (Romans 1:18, which is orthodox) — it says that truth's stimulus, if left unrestrained, would of itself "lead the mind naturally to obey God," making the sinner's own restraint the only obstacle to the obedience and repentance he goes on to demand. That is canon 7's condemned claim: a right choice relating to salvation by natural powers, with no illuminating work of the Holy Spirit in the account; his later mention of the Spirit's withdrawal is a penalty for prior resistance, not the ground of the choice. Scripture: not a Bible quotation Challenge 2: the claim heldThe sentence is Finney's own expository claim, not a text read aloud or a view voiced to be answered — the scripture check finds no match, and the surrounding paragraph is his definition of "holding the truth in unrighteousness." On his account the mind's constitution is such that truth, left unrestrained, would of itself lead to obedience to God, so the sole obstacle to the right salvific choice (he frames the required obedience as repentance and submission) is the sinner's own willful restraining; no illumination of the Spirit is held necessary to produce it. That is canon 7's condemned claim rather than a sharpening of it, and no mainstream tradition teaches that natural truth-stimulus of itself yields obedience — Reformed teaching holds natural revelation sufficient to obligate and condemn but not to convert, and Arminianism requires prevenient grace. Scripture: not a Bible quotation Challenge 3: the claim heldThe sentence is Finney's own expository claim, not scripture or a quoted view — it sits in his explanation of what "holding the truth in unrighteousness" means, immediately after "The human mind is so constituted that truth is its natural stimulus." As he frames it, the only thing standing between a man and obeying God is the man's own voluntary restraining of truth's "natural influence"; the mind's unobstructed natural constitution would carry it into obedience, with no illumination of the Spirit needed. Since the sermon treats that obedience as precisely the difference between saints and sinners ("saints have adopted Gods' will as their law of activity"), this is natural power sufficing for the saving choice — the claim Orange canon 7 anathematises, and not merely the ordinary teaching that general revelation leaves men without excuse, which asserts culpability rather than natural ability to obey. Scripture: not a Bible quotation |
| Repentance Before Prayer for Forgivenesspreached c. 1851 · #8220 |
| Pelagianism, rejected at the Council of Carthage, 418: Because God commands, the human being must be able to obey“Because God commands, the human being must be able to obey — 'if I ought, I can'.” Words as recorded in Pelagius, Epistula ad Demetriadem (Letter to Demetrias), Ad Demetriadem 2-8, 16, 413 · Condemned by a council · Council of Carthage, 418 · source: the file records no link for this document | Published the claim held on all 3 challenges read in the whole sermon the challenges, in fullChallenge 1: the claim heldThe sentence is Finney's own numbered remark, not scripture read aloud nor a view voiced to be answered, and its stated ground is exactly the inference the proposition names: since God requires repentance, inability would make the command an impossibility and God a tyrant — therefore the sinner can. The surrounding sermon closes off the orthodox form of "God does not command impossibilities," which always couples the command with enabling grace: Finney says Simon "had free will enough and ability enough to repent if he would," that the Bible assumes "I can repent... every where—in all its commands," and that God "gives you repentance by persuading you to repent" and "there is no other possible way in which He can give you repentance," i.e. no infused ability. That is the command-implies-native-ability position Carthage 418 condemned, not imputed righteousness or Wesleyan prevenient grace. Scripture: not a Bible quotation Challenge 2: the claim heldThe sentence is Finney's own numbered remark, not scripture read aloud nor a view voiced to be answered, and he supplies the inference himself in the next breath: God requires repentance, therefore to plead inability is to charge God with "requiring you to do impossibilities." That is the ought-implies-can move itself, not a sharpening of it, and the sermon forecloses the one orthodox reading that could rescue it — ability conferred by enabling grace — since Finney grounds the ability in the sinner's own will ("free will enough and ability enough to repent if he would"), tells the awakened sinner he "need not pray for the Holy Ghost," and reduces God's giving of repentance to moral persuasion ("there is no other possible way in which He can give you repentance"). Read in that setting, the claim is that the command alone establishes the capacity. Scripture: not a Bible quotation Challenge 3: the claim heldThe sentence comes in the preacher's own closing remarks, not in a read text or a reported view, and its stated ground is the inference from command to ability: to deny ability is to accuse God of "requiring you to do impossibilities," i.e. tyranny — which is precisely "if I ought, I can." The surrounding sermon forecloses the charitable reading that only responsibility, not ability, is meant: he asserts the sinner "was abundantly able to repent," "had free will enough and ability enough to repent if he would," rebukes directing sinners to pray for the Spirit's help as assuming "he is willing to repent but cannot, and therefore needs God's power to help him," and reduces the gift of repentance to moral persuasion. That is the condemned proposition, not the orthodox claim that inability is no excuse. Scripture: not a Bible quotation |
| Repentance Before Prayer for Forgivenesspreached c. 1851 · #8220 |
| Pelagianism, rejected at the Council of Carthage, 418: that grace only illuminates the understanding without also enabling the doing“Canons against the heresy of Pelagius and Caelestius — eight canons anathematising, in turn: that Adam was created mortal and would have died apart from sin; that infants are not baptised for the remission of original sin; that grace remits past sins only and does not assist against future ones; that grace only illuminates the understanding without also enabling the doing; that grace makes obedience easier rather than possible; that 'if we say we have no sin we deceive ourselves' is said only out of humility; that the saints say 'forgive us our trespasses' only on others' behalf; and that they say it without meaning it of themselves.” Words as recorded in Council of Carthage, canon 112, 418-05-01 · Condemned by a council · Council of Carthage, 418 · source: Council of Carthage, canons against the heresy of Pelagius and Celestius (Code of Canons of the African Church, canons 108-116) | Published the claim held on all 3 challenges read in the whole sermon the challenges, in fullChallenge 1: the claim heldFinney does not merely order repentance before prayer; in his own voice he confines the Spirit's work toward the sinner to impressing truth on the mind and expressly excludes the Spirit making, enabling or "even help[ing]" the sinner repent, adding that there is "no other possible way" God can give repentance. That is precisely Carthage's condemned position that grace illuminates the understanding without conferring power to do. The exhortation-order reading cannot rescue it, because the denial of any enabling assistance is asserted as doctrine, not merely as pastoral sequence. Scripture: not a Bible quotation Challenge 2: the claim heldThe denial that the sinner should pray "even to help you repent" is Finney's own doctrinal claim, not reported speech used for some other purpose: he argues through the sermon that the sinner "had free will enough and ability enough to repent if he would," and that the Spirit's whole "office-work as respects the sinner" is to take "truth and reveal it to the sinner in impressive aspects." He then states in his own voice that God gives repentance only by persuading and impressing truth, and that "there is no other possible way" — grace limited to illuminating the understanding, with the doing left to unaided will, which is precisely what the Carthaginian canon anathematises rather than a mere sharpening of ordinary teaching. Prevenient-grace traditions that urge immediate repentance still hold that grace enables the act; Finney expressly closes off that enabling, so no orthodox reading rescues the sentence. Scripture: not a Bible quotation Challenge 3: the claim heldFinney is not reading scripture or voicing another: he is arguing in his own voice about what the Spirit's work is and what sinners may therefore ask for. He states that the Spirit's office toward the sinner is to "take truth and reveal it," that God gives repentance only "by bringing truth before your mind," that there is "no other possible way," and accordingly that one must not pray for the Spirit "even to help you repent" — which is exactly the illumination-without-enabling account of grace that Carthage anathematised, and no mainstream tradition teaches that grace can do nothing but inform the understanding (Reformed, Catholic and Wesleyan accounts all posit grace that moves or enables the will). Scripture: not a Bible quotation |
| Repentance Before Prayer for Forgivenesspreached c. 1851 · #8220 |
| 2 teachings
| Published the claim held on all 3 challenges read in the whole sermon |
| Repentance Before Prayer for Forgivenesspreached c. 1851 · #8220 |
| Semi-Pelagianism, rejected at the Second Council of Orange, 529: the first movement toward God, the beginning of faith or bare willingness to believe (initium fidei, and the credulitatis affectus)…“But the first movement toward God, the beginning of faith or bare willingness to believe (initium fidei, and the credulitatis affectus), can arise from the human being, and God's grace then meets, enables and completes it.” Words as recorded in John Cassian, Conlationes (Conferences), Conference 13 (Abbot Chaeremon, on the Protection of God), Conference 13, chapters 8-13, c. 426-429 · Condemned by a council · Second Council of Orange (Concilium Arausicanum II), 529 · source: John Cassian, Conlationes (Conferences), Conference 13 (Abbot Chaeremon, on the Protection of God) | Published the claim held on all 3 challenges read in the whole sermon the challenges, in fullChallenge 1: the claim heldThe words are Finney's own answer to his hearer's objection, not scripture read aloud nor a view stated to be refuted — he poses the sinner's question and answers it affirmatively in his own voice, consistent with the whole sermon ("You can repent and you ought to do it immediately!", "this man had free will enough and ability enough to repent if he would"). The proposition is precisely that the initial turning and bare willingness to believe originate in the man, with grace then meeting and completing it, which is exactly the structure here: the sinner must first repent and believe of his own native ability, after which "God is infinitely ready to meet and bless you... He will meet you with smiles of loving-kindness." The Arminian prevenient-grace reading, which would have rescued this, is explicitly shut off: Finney denies that the sinner should pray for God "to make you repent, or even to help you repent," and reduces God's gift of repentance to presenting truth to a will already able. Scripture: not a Bible quotation Challenge 2: the claim heldThe preacher voices the hearer's question but answers it himself, and the whole sermon is built on that answer: "You can repent and you ought to do it immediately," Simon Magus "was abundantly able to repent," and praying for God to "make you able to repent" or even "help you repent" is called mocking God. That closes off the Arminian prevenient-grace reading, which would locate the enabling in grace before the act; here the turning is the sinner's own act, and God's work is only to press truth on the mind and then, "the very first moment you come before God with a penitent heart," to meet him with pardon. That is the condemned structure exactly: the initium fidei from the man, grace meeting and completing it. Scripture: not a Bible quotation Challenge 3: the claim heldThe "Yes" answers are Finney's own, given in direct address to the hearer, not read scripture and not a voiced opponent — the hypothetical question is the hearer's, the affirmation is the preacher's. The surrounding sermon forecloses the orthodox prevenient-grace reading explicitly: he rejects teaching sinners to pray for enabling ("Men sometimes teach sinners to pray that God would make them able to repent"), insists the sinner "had free will enough and ability enough to repent if he would," reduces God's giving of repentance to moral persuasion, and then has grace meet the already-turned heart ("the very first moment you come before God with a penitent heart, He will meet you"). That is precisely the structure of the proposition — the initial movement of faith and penitence arising from the man, with grace meeting and completing it — which Orange II condemned. Scripture: not a Bible quotation |
Show the 55 withdrawn passages
Passages 11–20 of 55
Each quote is the sermon’s words, said in the preacher’s own voice.
| Sermon | What was said | Matches | Result |
|---|---|---|---|
| The One Thing Needfulpreached c. 1859 · #8232 |
| 2 teachings
| Withdrawn withdrawn on 3 of 3 challenges: the quote doesn't actually say this read in the whole sermon |
| Christian Consciousness, A Witness for Godpreached c. 1858 · #8231 |
| Semi-Pelagianism, rejected at the Second Council of Orange, 529: God is described as awaiting the human turn, and grace as responding to it“On this account God is described as awaiting the human turn, and grace as responding to it.” Words as recorded in The Canons of the Second Council of Orange, with the concluding definition, Canons 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 529 · Condemned by a council · Second Council of Orange (Concilium Arausicanum II), 529 · source: The Canons of the Second Council of Orange, with the concluding definition | Withdrawn withdrawn on 3 of 3 challenges: the quote doesn't actually say this read in the whole sermon the challenges, in fullChallenge 1: withdrawnThe quoted line is the closing application of Finney's shipwreck illustration, in which Christ is the one who "draws near" and hails the sinner first, with the sinner's "Lay by me till morning" as the refusal. That ordering has grace taking the initiative and awaiting a response to its own prior approach — the reverse of the condemned claim that grace merely responds to a human turn that God passively awaits. Even read as an appeal for decision, inviting a response to a grace already offered is ordinary evangelistic preaching and does not carry the Orange proposition; the voiced words are also put in Christ's mouth within a figure rather than asserted as a doctrinal account of how grace operates. Why: the quote doesn't actually say this · Scripture: not a Bible quotation Challenge 2: withdrawnThe quoted line is the closing application of the ship-rescue anecdote: Christ draws near and calls out an offer of help. That is an evangelistic appeal urging immediate response, which every mainstream tradition makes; it does not assert that God stands back waiting for the human turn before grace acts — on the contrary, Christ is depicted as the one who approaches and initiates. The sentence therefore does not carry the Orange-condemned claim that grace follows and responds to a prior unaided human movement. Why: the quote doesn't actually say this · Scripture: not a Bible quotation Challenge 3: withdrawnThe quoted line is the closing move of an extended nautical anecdote (the brig hailing the Central America), applied as an evangelistic appeal; in the image it is Christ who "draws near" and "hails aloud" first, so the initiative depicted is divine, not human. Orange II condemns the view that grace follows and responds to a human beginning of faith; a call to answer a Savior who has already approached is the ordinary gospel invitation preached across mainstream traditions, including those that most firmly affirm prevenient grace. The sentence therefore does not carry the claim that God waits on the human turn before grace acts. Why: the quote doesn't actually say this · Scripture: not a Bible quotation |
| The Wrath of God Against Those Who Withstand His Truthpreached c. 1857 · #8230 |
| 2 teachings
| Withdrawn withdrawn on challenge; why, for each teaching, is under its name read in the whole sermon the same words were also matched against Semi-Pelagianism, where they were published |
| On Sinningpreached c. 1857 · #8229 |
| Pelagianism, rejected at the Council of Carthage, 418: Because God commands, the human being must be able to obey“Because God commands, the human being must be able to obey — 'if I ought, I can'.” Words as recorded in Pelagius, Epistula ad Demetriadem (Letter to Demetrias), Ad Demetriadem 2-8, 16, 413 · Condemned by a council · Council of Carthage, 418 · source: the file records no link for this document | Withdrawn withdrawn on 3 of 3 challenges: the quote doesn't actually say this read in the whole sermon the challenges, in fullChallenge 1: withdrawnThe evidence is not a statement but a reported exchange capped by a rhetorical counter-question: Finney relays what he "has been often asked" and replies by redirecting the inquiry from ability to obligation. He nowhere draws the inference the proposition requires — that because God commands, man must therefore be able — and in the very next lines he sets the factual question of attainment aside as "another question entirely," keeping the sermon's whole argument on neglect of *known duty*. Indeed he elsewhere presses the same duty on those "who admit entire sanctification to be their duty, while they do not admit that it is attainable," which is the opposite of inferring can from ought. The quote will not carry "if I ought, I can." Why: the quote doesn't actually say this · Scripture: not a Bible quotation Challenge 2: withdrawnThe evidence is a rhetorical counter-question in which Finney declines to answer "can a man live without sin?" and redirects the hearer to "ought a man live without sin?" — he immediately adds that whether anybody actually does "is another question entirely" and that "our question now turns on known duty." That is a refocusing of the subject onto obligation, not an assertion that obligation entails ability. Indeed elsewhere in the same sermon he presses responsibility on those "who admit entire sanctification to be their duty, while they do not admit that it is attainable," which is the opposite inference from "if I ought, I can"; and the attainment he urges is tied to "the grace provided in Christ and in the Spirit," not to unaided natural power. Why: the quote doesn't actually say this · Scripture: not a Bible quotation Challenge 3: withdrawnThe quoted exchange is a rhetorical counter-question whose asserted content, at most, is that a man ought to live without sin — that the law requires sinlessness — which is ordinary teaching and not the Pelagian inference. Finney does not here draw the condemned entailment from "ought" to "can"; indeed in the very next lines he separates the questions ("Do you believe that anybody does? That is another question entirely. Our question now turns on known duty, and accruing obligations"), and the sermon's stated principle runs the other way ("It is duty and nothing but duty that brings on us responsibility"). The evidence therefore does not carry the claim that because God commands, the human being must be able to obey. Why: the quote doesn't actually say this · Scripture: not a Bible quotation |
| On Sinningpreached c. 1857 · #8229 |
| Pelagianism, rejected at the Council of Carthage, 418: Because God commands, the human being must be able to obey“Because God commands, the human being must be able to obey — 'if I ought, I can'.” Words as recorded in Pelagius, Epistula ad Demetriadem (Letter to Demetrias), Ad Demetriadem 2-8, 16, 413 · Condemned by a council · Council of Carthage, 418 · source: the file records no link for this document | Withdrawn withdrawn on 3 of 3 challenges: the quote doesn't actually say this read in the reframes alone the challenges, in fullChallenge 1: withdrawnThe quoted sentence says only that a man who sees a duty and decides against it has thereby decided not to obey God — a claim about the sinfulness of refusing known duty, which Augustine and the Carthaginian fathers would affirm as readily as anyone. It makes no inference from command to ability, and so does not carry the Pelagian proposition "if I ought, I can"; the word "decides" presupposes a man who could have done otherwise in this instance, not the general doctrine that obligation proves capacity. Whatever the sermon says elsewhere about "ought" and "can", this evidence does not bear the claim placed on it, so the classification as framed cannot be defended. Why: the quote doesn't actually say this · Scripture: not a Bible quotation Challenge 2: withdrawnThe proposition is an inference from obligation to ability ("if I ought, I can"), but the quoted sentences say only that a man who sees a duty and decides against it has thereby decided not to obey God — a claim about the culpability of willful refusal, not about what command entails regarding power. Every mainstream tradition, Augustine included, teaches that knowing refusal of a known duty is sin, so the quote reads naturally without any Pelagian premise about native ability. Whatever Finney may assert elsewhere about ability, the evidence put forward here does not carry the condemned claim. Why: the quote doesn't actually say this · Scripture: not a Bible quotation Challenge 3: withdrawnThe quoted sentences say only that a man who sees a duty and decides against it has thereby decided not to obey God — a claim about the moral character of refusal, not about ability. The condemned proposition is the inference from command to capacity ("if I ought, I can"), and nothing in this evidence moves from obligation to ability; every tradition, Augustinian included, teaches that knowing refusal of known duty is sin. Whatever else may be said about Finney's wider scheme, this quote does not carry the claim placed on it. Why: the quote doesn't actually say this · Scripture: not a Bible quotation |
| Moral Insanitypreached c. 1856 · #8228 |
| Pelagianism, rejected at the Council of Carthage, 418: The capacity for good (posse) is God's gift in creation and cannot be lost; willing it (velle) and doing it…“The capacity for good (posse) is God's gift in creation and cannot be lost; willing it (velle) and doing it (esse) are the human being's own.” Words as recorded in Pelagius, Epistula ad Demetriadem (Letter to Demetrias), Ad Demetriadem 2-8, 16, 413 · Condemned by a council · Council of Carthage, 418 · source: the file records no link for this document | Withdrawn withdrawn on 3 of 3 challenges: the quote doesn't actually say this read in the whole sermon the challenges, in fullChallenge 1: withdrawnThe quoted sentence says only that the sinner's "moral insanity" arises from abusing reason rather than from losing it — i.e. that sin is voluntary and therefore culpable, which is ordinary teaching shared by Augustinian and Reformed writers insisting the will's rebellion is not an intellectual defect. It says nothing about posse being an inamissible gift of creation, and nothing about velle and esse being the human being's own apart from grace; the Pelagian tripartite scheme is simply not in these words. Finney's wider theology may lean that way elsewhere, but this sentence cannot carry the proposition put on it. Why: the quote doesn't actually say this · Scripture: not a Bible quotation Challenge 2: withdrawnThe quoted sentence says only that moral insanity arises from the abuse of an intact reason rather than from its loss — i.e., that sin is voluntary rather than a defect of the intellectual faculty. That is not the Pelagian tripartite claim that the posse is an inamissible gift of creation while the velle and esse are the human being's own; the proposition's distinctive content (an unloseable created capacity, and willing/doing as wholly the person's own) is simply absent from the sentence. Augustinian and Reformed writers likewise insist sin is voluntary and not an impairment of reason, so the sentence cannot bear the condemned position on its own. Why: the quote doesn't actually say this · Scripture: not a Bible quotation Challenge 3: withdrawnThe sentence is Finney's own voice, but it says only that moral insanity arises from the abuse of reason rather than its loss — i.e. that sin is voluntary rather than a defect of the intellectual faculty. It says nothing about a posse given in creation that cannot be lost, nor does it divide posse from velle and esse or assign the latter two to the human being alone. Augustine and the mainstream Western tradition likewise hold sin to be a voluntary abuse of the will against reason and conscience, so this sentence can be taught without teaching the Pelagian scheme condemned at Carthage. Why: the quote doesn't actually say this · Scripture: not a Bible quotation |
| Moral Insanitypreached c. 1856 · #8228 |
| Pelagianism, rejected at the Council of Carthage, 418: Because God commands, the human being must be able to obey“Because God commands, the human being must be able to obey — 'if I ought, I can'.” Words as recorded in Pelagius, Epistula ad Demetriadem (Letter to Demetrias), Ad Demetriadem 2-8, 16, 413 · Condemned by a council · Council of Carthage, 418 · source: the file records no link for this document | Withdrawn withdrawn on 3 of 3 challenges: the quote doesn't actually say this read in the whole sermon the challenges, in fullChallenge 1: withdrawnThe quoted sentence runs the inference in the opposite direction from the condemned proposition: it says that where the intellect is intact, moral obligation remains unimpaired (and, in the surrounding paragraph, that intellectual insanity suspends responsibility because the man "cannot know his duty"). That is the ordinary principle that culpability presupposes rational capacity — taught in Catholic, Reformed and common-law moral reasoning alike — not the Pelagian claim that God's command proves man's ability to obey. Nothing in this sentence moves from divine command to human power; it moves from retained faculties to continuing obligation. Why: the quote doesn't actually say this · Scripture: not a Bible quotation Challenge 2: withdrawnThe condemned proposition runs from divine command to human ability ("if I ought, I can"); the quoted sentence runs the other way, saying only that moral obligation stands so long as the intellect is intact. In context it is the conclusion of a discussion of intellectual insanity and voluntary drunkenness, and it states the wholly uncontroversial principle — held across Catholic and Reformed moral theology alike — that someone who has lost the use of reason is not culpable. Nothing in it derives a power to obey from the fact that God commands, so the sentence does not carry the Pelagian claim placed on it. Why: the quote doesn't actually say this · Scripture: not a Bible quotation Challenge 3: withdrawnThe quoted sentence is a summary rule about intellectual insanity and legal/moral accountability: so long as a person's intellect is intact, his obligation stands (and, correspondingly, the genuinely deranged man is not a moral agent). It makes no inference from God's command to a universal human power to obey; the Pelagian "if I ought, I can" is nowhere in it. Moreover, that a person who has lost the use of reason is not culpable is ordinary moral teaching in every mainstream tradition, so the sentence can be read without any Pelagian commitment. Why: the quote doesn't actually say this · Scripture: not a Bible quotation |
| Moral Insanitypreached c. 1856 · #8228 |
| Pelagianism, rejected at the Council of Carthage, 418: Grace is real and necessary, but it is understood as gift preceding and surrounding the act rather than as an…“Grace is real and necessary, but it is understood as gift preceding and surrounding the act rather than as an interior cause of it: the gift of a free nature, the law, the teaching and example of Christ, the forgiveness of past sins in baptism.” Words as recorded in Council of Carthage, canons against the heresy of Pelagius and Celestius (Code of Canons of the African Church, canons 108-116), Canons 111, 112, 113, 418 · Condemned by a council · Council of Carthage, 418 · source: Council of Carthage, canons against the heresy of Pelagius and Celestius (Code of Canons of the African Church, canons 108-116) | Withdrawn withdrawn on 3 of 3 challenges: the quote doesn't actually say this read in the whole sermon the challenges, in fullChallenge 1: withdrawnThe quoted sentence says only that God brings many influences to bear on the sinner's mind and that the sinner's obstinacy usually defeats them; it says nothing about grace being merely external gift rather than an interior cause. The condemned proposition is a sharpened denial of interior grace (nature, law, example, baptismal pardon only), and this sentence neither states nor implies that denial — indeed the same sermon closes by naming the Spirit as "God's agency for the cure of moral maniacs," which is grace working within. That God's calls are often resisted in vain is ordinary teaching across traditions, so the evidence cannot carry the Pelagian claim placed on it. Why: the quote doesn't actually say this · Scripture: not a Bible quotation Challenge 2: withdrawnThe quoted sentence says God brings influences to bear on the sinner's mind, usually in vain — its point is the obstinacy of the sinner's will, not a theory that grace is only external gift and never an interior cause. If anything it describes God working on the mind, and the sermon's close ("the importance of not quenching the Spirit. This is God's agency for the cure of moral maniacs") affirms an interior divine agency. That God's calls are often resisted is ordinary teaching across traditions (cf. Acts 7:51) and carries nothing of the Pelagian denial condemned at Carthage. Why: the quote doesn't actually say this · Scripture: not a Bible quotation Challenge 3: withdrawnThe quoted sentence says only that God brings many influences to bear on the sinner's mind and that these are usually resisted; it says nothing about whether grace operates interiorly or merely as external gift and example. Resisted divine calling is taught across mainstream traditions (and Finney himself closes by naming the Spirit as "God's agency for the cure of moral maniacs," an interior working), so the sentence cannot be made to carry the Carthaginian proposition about grace as non-interior cause. The classification rests on inference from Finney's wider reputation rather than on what this sentence asserts. Why: the quote doesn't actually say this · Scripture: not a Bible quotation |
| Moral Insanitypreached c. 1856 · #8228 |
| Socinianism, suppressed by the Sejm of Poland-Lithuania, 1638: The will is free and undamaged“The will is free and undamaged.” Words as recorded in The Racovian Catechism (Catechesis ecclesiarum quae in Regno Poloniae ... affirmant), On free will (Rees, 1818), 1605-1609 · Suppressed by a state, not condemned by a council · The Sejm (Diet) of Poland-Lithuania, 1638 · source: the file records no link for this document | Withdrawn withdrawn on 3 of 3 challenges: the quote doesn't actually say this read in the whole sermon the challenges, in fullChallenge 1: withdrawnThe quoted sentence affirms that the sinner has the powers of free moral agency and that he "persistently abuses them" — and the surrounding paragraph is explicit that it is precisely the will that is disordered ("Moral insanity... is will-madness"; "the heart deliberately disobeys"; later "a diseased heart and soul"), while it is the *intellect* that Finney calls unimpaired. The condemned Racovian proposition asserts an undamaged will, i.e. no corruption of the voluntary powers; this sentence asserts the opposite about the will, pairing agency with persistent, culpable abuse. Mere affirmation of free moral agency and responsibility is also taught across mainstream traditions without the Socinian claim, so the quote cannot bear the proposition put on it. Why: the quote doesn't actually say this · Scripture: not a Bible quotation Challenge 2: withdrawnThe proposition is a conjunction — the will is free AND undamaged — and the quoted sentence asserts only the first half while expressly denying the second: "He has the powers of free moral agency, but persistently abuses them." The whole sermon's thesis is that the will is diseased ("moral insanity is will-madness," "a diseased heart and soul," "all was utterly deranged"), with only the intellect left unimpaired. Affirming that sinners remain responsible moral agents who voluntarily sin is also ordinary teaching across mainstream traditions and carries no claim that the will is undamaged. Why: the quote doesn't actually say this · Scripture: not a Bible quotation Challenge 3: withdrawnThe quoted sentence affirms that the sinner remains an accountable moral agent who "persistently abuses" his powers — that is, it asserts culpable misuse, not an intact and healthy will. The surrounding argument says the opposite of the condemned proposition: Finney's whole thesis is that in moral insanity it is precisely "the will and voluntary powers" that are disordered, the heart "diseased," the moral nature "utterly deranged," while only the intellect "retains its powers unimpaired." Retained moral agency under sinful abuse is taught across mainstream traditions as the ground of responsibility, and does not carry the Racovian claim that the will is free and undamaged. Why: the quote doesn't actually say this · Scripture: not a Bible quotation |
| Moral Insanitypreached c. 1856 · #8228 |
| Socinianism, suppressed by the Sejm of Poland-Lithuania, 1638: God's assistance is real and is given to those who seek it, but it does not overcome an incapacity, because…“God's assistance is real and is given to those who seek it, but it does not overcome an incapacity, because there is none.” Words as recorded in The Racovian Catechism (Catechesis ecclesiarum quae in Regno Poloniae ... affirmant), On free will (Rees, 1818), 1605-1609 · Suppressed by a state, not condemned by a council · The Sejm (Diet) of Poland-Lithuania, 1638 · source: the file records no link for this document | Withdrawn withdrawn on 3 of 3 challenges: the quote doesn't actually say this read in the whole sermon the challenges, in fullChallenge 1: withdrawnThe cited sentence says only that sinners refuse a freely offered salvation — it says nothing about divine assistance, and nothing about there being no incapacity to be overcome. The proposition is a sharp Socinian claim about grace meeting no inability; "they will not take it as a gift" is the ordinary evangelical and Reformed language of the free offer and the sinner's willful refusal (cf. "ye will not come to me, that ye might have life"), and is preached without any denial of inability. Whatever Finney asserts about ability elsewhere, this quote does not carry the claim placed on it. Why: the quote doesn't actually say this · Scripture: not a Bible quotation Challenge 2: withdrawnThe cited sentence says only that sinners refuse a salvation freely offered to them — the standard evangelical free offer and the culpable "ye will not come to me" of John 5:40, which every mainstream tradition, Reformed included, preaches. The Racovian proposition is a two-part claim about grace: that divine assistance is given to those who seek it and that it overcomes no incapacity because none exists. The quote says nothing about divine assistance or about the presence or absence of incapacity, and indeed this sermon later calls the Spirit "God's agency for the cure of moral maniacs." The evidence does not carry the condemned claim. Why: the quote doesn't actually say this · Scripture: not a Bible quotation Challenge 3: withdrawnThe quoted sentence — that sinners, offered an infinite wealth of blessedness for the mere acceptance, "will not take it as a gift" — says only that the gospel is freely offered and that sinners refuse it. That is the common stock of evangelical preaching in every tradition, including Reformed preaching that affirms total inability; the refusal is described as willful, not as proof that no incapacity exists. The proposition under review is specifically about divine assistance not overcoming an incapacity "because there is none," and the quote makes no claim at all about grace, assistance, or the presence or absence of inability. Why: the quote doesn't actually say this · Scripture: not a Bible quotation |
Withdrawn passages, 10 to a page, each with its challenges in full: 1–10 · 11–20 · 21–30 · 31–40 · 41–50 · 51–55
How these were counted
The part of each printed sermon read: teaching 40 — each part named with how many printed sermons it was read in.
- printed sermons
- 40
- window
- every printed sermon held here
- read by
- an AI model; details in About the study
We checked the sermons of Charles G. Finney against 115 rejected teachings, reading 22 whole sermons and the reframes of 39 sermons.
61 passages looked like a match. Each was then challenged three separate times, and is published only if it held every time.
The withdrawn passages come from 22 of the 39 sermons checked.
Read whole. 22 of the 40 sermons in the basis above were read whole against 115 historically rejected teachings, and 62 passages looked like a match on that reading.
Read in their reframes. 39 of the 40 sermons in the basis above were read only in the passages where it reframed a part of the gospel against 115 historically rejected teachings, and 7 passages looked like a match on that reading.
Each of those lines counts only the sermons read that way, and the teachings they were read against, not every sermon in the basis.